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Abstract 9 
Millions of people die every year around the world from diarrheal diseases much of which is caused by 10 
contaminated drinking water.  By contrast, drinking water safety is largely taken for granted by many citizens of 11 
affluent nations.  The ability to drink water that is delivered into households without fear of becoming ill may be one 12 
of the key defining characteristics of developed nations in relation to the majority of the world.  Yet there is well-13 
documented evidence that disease outbreaks remain a risk that could be better managed and prevented even in 14 
affluent nations.  A detailed retrospective analysis of more than 70 case studies of disease outbreaks in 15 affluent 15 
nations over the past 30 years provides the basis for much of our discussion (Hrudey & Hrudey, 2004).  The insights 16 
provided can assist in developing a better understanding within the water industry of the causes of drinking water 17 
disease outbreaks, so that more effective preventive measures can be adopted by water systems that are vulnerable.  18 
This preventive feature lies at the core of risk management for the provision of safe drinking water. 19 
 20 
1.  Introduction 21 
1.1. Risk management in the modern water utility business 22 
Managing risk is an essential business requirement across the process and utility sectors.  From 23 
embedding good corporate governance within organizations through to the management of individual 24 
projects and assets, the ability to understand and assess risk and to implement preventive measures to 25 
improve control of risk is a mainstream activity (Pollard et al., 2004).  Many of the larger water utilities 26 
have connected their responsibilities for financial control with the risk management programmes that are 27 
implemented throughout their businesses, including the operational risk analysis and management 28 
activities at the process plant level.  In the water industry, there is a need for a continued shift in the 29 
approach to risk management from one historically implicit to treatment plant design and operation to one 30 
increasingly explicit and better integrated within the core business of providing safe and wholesome 31 
drinking water that deserves the trust of consumers. 32 
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The benefits of good corporate risk management should achieve the preventive management of 1 
risks throughout a business.  One potential danger may be that the principal goal of assuring public health 2 
protection through safe drinking water may be viewed as only equivalent to many other priorities in the 3 
organization.  With the focus increasingly on income, expenditure and whole-life costing under new 4 
institutional arrangements for the provision of drinking water, new facilities are being designed to refined 5 
and better-characterized margins of safety.  Water utilities must seek not only to meet their legislative 6 
requirements but also maximize the availability, serviceability and life of their assets and minimize 7 
expenditure on energy, chemicals and processes.  But whilst new arrangements undoubtedly offer greater 8 
management control and flexibility in decision-making, the drive for shareholder dividend or stakeholder 9 
value must be second to maintaining a secure and safe water supply system.  We contend that an over-10 
emphasis on the administration of risk management in isolation of practical knowledge on what can go 11 
wrong in practice, can itself be a hazard.  Further, we note caution in an inappropriate use of risk 12 
management as the rationale for ‘optimizing’ infrastructure and process systems below what may 13 
inadvertently become inadequate margins of safety.  In this paper, we discuss current advances in water 14 
quality risk management in the light of six case studies that aptly describe what can go wrong when risk 15 
management and specifically, public health risk management fails to be the primary focus. 16 
On a continuing basis around the world an estimated 1.8 million people die every year from 17 
diarrheal diseases (including cholera). The majority of these deaths is among children in developing 18 
countries and up to 39% of diarrheal disease could be prevented by household water treatment by 19 
chlorination (WHO, 2004a). By contrast, drinking water safety is largely taken for granted by many 20 
citizens of affluent nations.  The ability to drink water that is delivered into households without fear of 21 
becoming ill may be one of the key defining characteristics of developed nations in relation to the 22 
majority of the world. Valuing that enormous benefit appropriately must be a core value guiding risk 23 
management in the drinking water business. 24 
 25 
 1.1.2. A concept of safe drinking water 26 
If the goal of risk management in the water utility sector is to assure safe drinking water, we 27 
need to consider what is safe.  The concept of safety, while largely intuitive to the public, has confounded 28 
debates about risk management for decades.  Perhaps these debates can be resolved by first considering 29 
what safe is not.  Safe does not mean zero risk.  To demand an absolute standard would guarantee that 30 
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nothing could be considered safe, making safety a meaningless concept.  There is no sharp line between 1 
safe and unsafe because safety has meaning on a relative basis.  Finally, each person has an individual 2 
notion of safety that may vary from one risk to another.  We propose a pragmatic notion of safety as “a 3 
level of risk so negligible that a reasonable, well-informed individual need not be concerned about it, nor 4 
find any rational basis to change his/her behaviour to avoid such a small, but non-zero risk”.  This notion 5 
was first articulated in the context of addressing whether there could be a safe dose for exposure to a 6 
carcinogen, an example that squarely confronts the distinction between safety and zero risk (Hrudey & 7 
Krewski, 1995).  More recently, the issue of what constitutes safe drinking water was addressed for Part 2 8 
of the Walkerton Inquiry (Canada) that was charged with recommending how a disaster like the 9 
Walkerton drinking water disease outbreak, which killed seven and made 2,300 ill, could be prevented 10 
from re-occurring in Ontario (O'Connor, 2002b). A similar notion of drinking water safety was adopted. 11 
In the context of drinking water, and given our current capability for reducing risk, this notion of 12 
safe drinking water should mean that we do not expect to die or become seriously ill from drinking or 13 
using it.  Assuring that drinking water is essentially free (to negligible levels) from the risk of infectious 14 
disease can be, and largely has been, achieved for most public water supplies in affluent nations.  The 15 
challenge for drinking water risk management is to maintain and extend that remarkable achievement as 16 
widely as possible. 17 
 18 
1.2. Characteristics of risk management for safe drinking water 19 
The Walkerton Inquiry described some essential characteristics of risk management as: 20 
• “being preventive rather than reactive; 21 
• distinguishing greater risks from lesser ones and dealing first with the former; 22 
• taking time to learn from experience; and 23 
• investing resources in risk management that are proportional to the danger posed.” (O'Connor, 24 
2002b). 25 
 26 
Managing risk effectively requires making sensible decisions within the constraints of 27 
knowledge and resources.  Risk management is an exercise of decision-making under uncertainty.  Even 28 
if negligible scientific uncertainty could be achieved, the wide range of competing views for social 29 
priorities would still challenge decision-making, but at least the evidentiary basis for any decision would 30 
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be clear.  For drinking water disease outbreaks, cases with such clarity of scientific evidence are the 1 
exception rather than the rule.  Because there is always some uncertainty in the evidence, errors in 2 
decisions can be of two main types (Hrudey & Leiss, 2003; Hrudey & Rizak, 2004): 3 
(i) a decision could be made to act when there is truly no need - a false positive error; 4 
(ii) a decision could be made not to act, when there is truly a need - a false negative error. 5 
These types of errors can be illustrated by reference to some of the cases reviewed below.  The 1998 6 
Sydney water crisis has been described as a case of issuing a boil water alert for Sydney residents on the 7 
basis of erroneous monitoring results (Clancy, 2000), making that decision a false positive error.  8 
Walkerton was perhaps the most severe example of a false negative error.  Warnings at Walkerton about 9 
drinking water quality had been ignored for over 20 years. Ultimately, tragedy ensued.  Given these 10 
examples, a commitment to precaution for public health decisions demands a preference for false positive 11 
over false negative errors, because the consequences of the latter are usually more direct and potentially 12 
more severe.  However, there are inevitably policy implications to false positive errors as well.  In the 13 
Sydney case, tens of millions of dollars of public funds were spent on circumstances where investigation 14 
revealed that public health was not harmed.  The merits of the decisions involved have remained a source 15 
of debate.  However, given their access to and understanding of the evidence provided at the outset of this 16 
incident, the public inquiry found that health authorities chose correctly in deciding to issue a system-17 
wide boil water alert in the first instance (McClellan, 1998).  Although the merits of each case will differ, 18 
the general reality remains that frequent false positive errors eventually create a “cry wolf” response with 19 
the public such that important measures like boil water advisories may be ignored when they are truly 20 
needed to protect public health.  Although the decision-making challenge for boil water advisories can be 21 
characterized in relatively stark terms after the fact, when outcomes are known (with the benefit of 22 
hindsight), the reality for any outbreak situation is that the evidence is usually not clear as the events are 23 
unfolding. 24 
 25 
2.  Learning from experience 26 
2.1. The analysis of failure 27 
The multiple barrier approach to assuring safe drinking water is founded on the maintenance of 28 
multiple unit processes and procedures to ensure that pathogens and undesirable chemicals do not reach 29 
the consumer’s tap.  Maintaining these barriers to exposure is critical because, by and large, each barrier 30 
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in series can offer orders of magnitude (log) levels of protection to the drinking water supply.  The level 1 
of barriers required must be a function of the level of challenge posed by the source water (Figure 1).  2 
Barriers are often thought of in terms of treatment technology but additional critical barriers involve 3 
source water protection, distribution security and monitoring/response capabilities. The failure, or bypass, 4 
of any single barrier must be a major concern for operators.  The potential technical failures that might 5 
occur provide only part of the story because risks usually manifest themselves through a combination of 6 
technical, management and human errors (Figure 2).  Undertaking a ‘forensic analysis’ of historic 7 
incidents can highlight the aspects of risk management that are often ignored. 8 
 9 
Fig. 1.  Drinking water risk management and the multiple barrier approach (Hrudey, 2001) 10 
 11 
Fig. 2.  Reasons for system failures (after Hurst, 1998). 12 
 13 
We performed an analysis of the major factors contributing to drinking water disease outbreaks 14 
by searching electronically and through bibliographic cross-referencing the published English language 15 
literature over the past 30 years.  We screened papers for those that discussed specific disease outbreaks 16 
in affluent nations and which described some of the failure modes contributing to the outbreak.  We did 17 
not attempt to review all outbreaks.  There was substantial variation in the quality and detail of the 18 
description of failure mechanisms among the papers that we retrieved.  In all, over 70 case studies were 19 
prepared from this database and are analyzed in detail elsewhere (Hrudey & Hrudey, 2004).  The case 20 
studies included six outbreaks where fatalities arose, causing a total of 22 deaths during or shortly after 21 
the outbreak and an estimated 50 to 70 deaths over the two years following the Milwaukee outbreak 22 
(Hrudey & Hrudey, 2004).  These fatal outbreaks are summarized in Table 1. The risk management 23 
lessons are reviewed in the next section. 24 
 25 
2.1. Recurring themes 26 
The factors contributing to outbreak failures summarized in Table 1 included: sewage 27 
contamination of raw water, inadequate knowledge of source water hazards, inadequate disinfection, 28 
extreme weather (heavy precipitation, runoff), cross-connections and distribution failures, filtration 29 
failures, livestock or wildlife fecal contamination and process changes.  More than one mechanism was 30 
involved in contributing to each outbreak and often vulnerable conditions had been in place for years, if 31 
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not decades.  In hindsight, all of these outbreaks were preventable. Although only fatal outbreaks from 1 
Hrudey and Hrudey (2004) are summarized below, these are reasonably representative of the features 2 
contributing to failure among the 70 case studies reviewed there.  3 
The 1983 Drumheller outbreak was caused by a spill of raw sewage upstream of the drinking 4 
water intake. Sewage overflows were common at this location during heavy storm flow conditions but 5 
this spill occurred because of a pump failure. The contamination source was certainly foreseeable. Even 6 
though the sewage pump station was operated by the same municipality as the drinking water utility, no 7 
notice of the incident was provided. The lack of notice precluded implementation of any precautionary 8 
measures, such as additional treatment by the water utility. Likewise, water quality monitoring might 9 
have provided earlier warning to initiate a boil water advisory. In this case, the boil water advisory was 10 
issued almost five days after the first signs of illness.  11 
The 1989 Cabool outbreak was caused by sewage contamination of drinking water in the 12 
distribution system during water main break repairs following unseasonably cold weather. The 13 
distribution system in this community was in poor repair and vulnerable to sewage contamination, while 14 
the sewer system was in worse condition experiencing regular sewer back-ups and overflows. The 15 
groundwater drinking water source for this community was of excellent quality and this water was 16 
distributed with no treatment and or real time warning system (e.g. chlorine residual monitoring). The 17 
combination of poorly maintained infrastructure, lack of any treatment or monitoring capacity and 18 
unusual weather events triggering upset conditions led to this fatal outbreak. 19 
In 1993, Milwaukee experienced an enormous outbreak of cryptosporidiosis in a drinking water 20 
system that practiced full conventional water treatment and was meeting their treated water quality 21 
standards at the time of the outbreak. This outbreak has been the subject of numerous publications, but the 22 
early speculation that the source of contamination was from upstream agricultural runoff has later been 23 
discounted. The most likely source of contamination was sanitary sewage discharge from Milwaukee that 24 
impacted the drinking water intake for one of their treatment plants. This circumstance mirrored previous 25 
winter outbreaks in Milwaukee in 1916, 1936 and 1938. Despite having what appeared to be adequate 26 
water treatment to cope with raw water contamination, the demands for optimum filtration performance, 27 
as measured by maximum turbidity removal, and disinfection capable of handling the chlorine-resistant 28 
pathogen, Cryptosporidium parvum, left Milwaukee vulnerable.  29 
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In hindsight, Milwaukee had not learned from the experience of the 1989 Swindon – Oxfordshire 1 
outbreak in England which led to the Badenoch expert panel report documenting the measures needed to 2 
prevent Cryptosporidium outbreaks (Badenoch et al., 1990). Likewise, there was an inadequate response 3 
to both the turbidity spike in filtered water and a sharp rise in consumer phone complaints that 4 
corresponded with the contamination episode. 5 
The 1993 Gideon fatal outbreak was caused by poor maintenance of water storage facilities that 6 
allowed bird fecal contamination that was flushed into the distribution system during an effort to flush the 7 
system because of water quality complaints. Like Cabool, this community had a high quality groundwater 8 
supply feeding into a poorly maintained distribution system without any treatment barrier. 9 
The 1999 Washington County Fair fatal outbreak was caused by inadequate awareness of the 10 
risk of shallow well contamination from a nearby septic seepage field. The well in question was allowed 11 
to supply unchlorinated water during the Fair and this source was improperly used for food and beverage 12 
production with tragic consequences. The well in question had never produced adverse microbiological 13 
monitoring results in the intermittent, seasonal monitoring program, but a severe drought over the 14 
previous summer may have made this well more vulnerable to near-surface contamination.  15 
The Walkerton outbreak in May 2000 involved a litany of failures from the operators, through 16 
management, the provincial regulator and the Government of Ontario (O'Connor, 2002a). The shallow 17 
well that became contaminated by cattle manure following heavy spring rainfall that caused widespread 18 
flooding, had been identified as vulnerable to agricultural contamination by the hydrogeologist who 19 
installed the well in 1978. His warnings were not fully heeded and over the years, adverse 20 
microbiological monitoring results were common without any remedial action. The operators were 21 
inadequately trained to recognize the risks or the need for requiring adequate chlorination. In particular, 22 
they were oblivious to the need for monitoring chlorine residual as a real time measure of disinfection 23 
performance for susceptible pathogens (Hrudey & Walker, 2005). The two year, $9 million public inquiry 24 
into this outbreak revealed the numerous failure at many levels (O'Connor, 2002a) and made over 100 25 
recommendations for how drinking water safety might be assured in Ontario in the future (O'Connor, 26 
2002a, b). 27 
In every case above, the numerous failures are obvious in hindsight. Yet the case studies 28 
presented span almost 20 years and the total collection of cases these are drawn from spans 30 years 29 
(Hrudey & Hrudey, 2004). Risk management seeks to achieve a preventive approach and therefore 30 
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effective risk management needs to demonstrate the ability to translate the enormous collection of 1 
hindsight available into effective foresight. 2 
 3 
3.  Drinking water risk management 4 
3.1. Overall risk management for drinking water utilities 5 
Over the past 25 years, the drinking water industry has faced rising consumer expectations and 6 
substantially more stringent regulatory requirements while experiencing dramatic changes from 7 
privatization, sector globalization, increased competition, emerging technologies and trends towards 8 
financial self-sufficiency.  These changes create both opportunities and risks across a variety of 9 
categories, including (Pollard et al., 2004): 10 
(i) Financial risk.  These are risks arising principally from the financial operations and 11 
management of drinking water as a business enterprise, whether or not the operating 12 
agency is a private entity.  13 
(ii) Commercial risk. In many jurisdictions, drinking water utilities are no longer protected 14 
as a public monopoly so they are no longer insulated from competition or financial 15 
instability.  16 
(iii) Environmental risk.  Equipment failure or human error can lead to adverse 17 
environmental impacts including waste discharges to the atmosphere, ground or water 18 
environment.  19 
(iv) Public health risk. The most vital duty of care that a drinking water utility holds is to 20 
assure the safety of the water provided to avoid adverse impacts on public health.  21 
(v) Reputation risk.  Even in the absence of dangers to public health, a water utility can 22 
experience harm if water quality characteristics of importance to consumers (taste, 23 
odour, appearance) are impaired or customer trust is damaged. 24 
(vi) Compliance/legal risk.  Legislation, regulations and common law liability set out 25 
minimum standards for water quality, the handling and storage of treatment chemicals, 26 
the discharge of wastes, and the health and safety of the operational staff and the people 27 
living nearby.  28 
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The foregoing analysis of failures and the discussions to follow on assuring safe drinking water are 1 
focussed primarily on public health risk combined with some obvious elements of reputation and 2 
compliance risk. 3 
 4 
3.2. A comprehensive risk management approach for drinking water safety (NHMRC) 5 
A comprehensive framework has been developed in Australia to outline a Total Quality 6 
Management (TQM) approach for drinking water quality and safety (Rizak et al., 2003; Hrudey, 2004; 7 
Sinclair & Rizak, 2004).  It is a broad approach to the entire scope of providing drinking water and can 8 
readily incorporate the excellent details that have been developed by other initiatives and it has now been 9 
adopted as the introductory framework for the Australian Drinking Water Guidelines (NHMRC, 2004).  10 
Figure 3 captures the 12 elements that make up the framework, starting with a policy commitment at the 11 
highest levels of responsibility in the organization to achieving drinking water quality.  Commitment 12 
means more than just meeting regulatory requirements by minimal margins, but a fundamental 13 
commitment to continuous improvement, serving as a cornerstone for employee responsibility and 14 
motivation.  From this commitment flows the series of elements related to system analysis and 15 
management with which we are perhaps more familiar as risk management tools. 16 
 17 
Fig. 3  Framework for Management of Drinking Water Quality (reprinted by permission of the National Health and Medical 18 
Research Council, Canberra, Australia) 19 
 20 
Assessment of a drinking water system includes: water-supply systems analysis, the review of 21 
water quality data, hazard identification, and risk assessment.  Preventive measures include: the 22 
emplacement of multiple barriers and the analysis and maintenance of critical control points.  Operational 23 
procedures and process control include: operating protocols, equipment capability, materials and 24 
chemicals, operational monitoring and, ultimately, preventive and corrective actions.  Verification of 25 
drinking water quality includes: conventional water quality monitoring, consumer satisfaction, short-term 26 
evaluation of results and corrective actions as required.  Incident and emergency response include 27 
communication planning and response protocols. 28 
The supporting requirements for this Framework are elements often overlooked in the short 29 
term, but which are vitally important to long-term performance.  Employee issues include awareness, 30 
involvement and training, with particular consideration given to the role of contractors.  Community 31 
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issues include consultation and communication to ensure that the drinking water provider is meeting the 1 
needs of the consumer.  Research and development has also been neglected in some perspectives when 2 
addressing assurance of safety.  A commitment to research is vital to assure that emerging risks are 3 
managed as thoroughly as possible, based on some predictive capability.  Applied research studies can 4 
include investigations and research monitoring, validation of process performance and design of 5 
equipment.  Documentation and reporting are necessary to prove that systems have been working as 6 
planned. 7 
Finally, to assure everyone concerned that the systems are functioning as they should be, there 8 
must be review processes.  These include periodic evaluation of long-term performance and an external 9 
audit of drinking water quality management performance.  All must be subject to review by senior 10 
management for evaluation in view of the goal of continual improvement.  This framework has been used 11 
to restructure the Australian Drinking Water Guidelines into a TQM risk management approach that will 12 
provide consumers with the means for judging whether their water provider is functioning as safely and 13 
effectively as circumstances reasonably allow.  The elements of this approach are flexible enough to 14 
allow implementation by each state in Australia, according to its own regulatory regime.  The TQM 15 
approach is intended to facilitate and support an effective regulatory process by helping to define the 16 
details of best practice in every jurisdiction and by providing consistent approaches for demonstrating 17 
best practice to the regulatory authority.  The TQM approach is not intended to replace an effective 18 
regulatory process that must be accountable to the public, only to improve the manner in which 19 
constructive improvements are achieved. 20 
Now that the framework is being adopted in Australia, more detailed supporting documents are 21 
being developed to guide its implementation for individual water utilities.  The core capacity of this 22 
approach to deliver risk management for the purposes of assuring drinking water safety is found in the 23 
second  and third elements of the Framework: 2. Assessment of the Drinking Water System; and 3. 24 
Preventive Measures for Drinking Water Quality Management.  These are based on the key concepts of 25 
hazard, hazardous event and risk, terms which are too often subject to confusion in applications of risk 26 
management.  Accordingly, they are defined in the Framework and more recently were adopted within the 27 
concept of Water Safety Plans of the Third  Edition of World Health Organization Guidelines for 28 
Drinking Water Quality (WHO, 2004a): 29 
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• A hazard is a biological, chemical, physical or radiological agent that has the potential to cause 1 
harm. 2 
• A hazardous event is an incident or situation that can lead to the presence of a hazard (what can 3 
happen and how). 4 
• Risk is the likelihood of identified hazards causing harm in exposed populations in a specified 5 
time frame, including the magnitude of that harm and the consequences. 6 
These concepts can be illustrated with a pathogen.  Cryptosporidium is a hazard for any surface water 7 
system because it is always potentially present given its occurrence in human sewage and/or livestock 8 
wastes.  A challenge to a water system by a waste source containing Cryptosporidium such as a sewage 9 
spill is a hazardous event.  The risk associated with Cryptosporidium is the likelihood that this pathogen 10 
will pass through the treatment system to reach consumers in an infectious state and in numbers sufficient 11 
to cause illness. 12 
An important contribution for implementing this element of a risk management approach is a 13 
report by Nadebaum et al. (2004) that provides comprehensive guidance on performing the hazard 14 
identification and risk assessment of the drinking water supply.  The assessment methodology is 15 
organized into six steps: (1) understand your system; (2) identify hazards, hazardous events and sources; 16 
(3) estimate risk for each identified hazard/event; (4) plan preventive measures for each identified 17 
hazard/event; (5) implement and monitor preventive measures; and (6) document a risk management plan.  18 
The hazard identification and risk assessment methodology provided by Nadebaum et al. (2004) is 19 
supported by individual hazard fact sheets, case studies and summaries of hazards for microbial and 20 
chemical contaminants.  These are extremely valuable to any water utility committed to implementing a 21 
risk management plan because the details of implementation must be based on local experience and the 22 
overall approach should be comprehensive, taking full advantage of valuable experience from others.  23 
The extent of experience captured in this reference is illustrated by the range of 36 hazard fact sheets and 24 
seven case studies that are provided (Table 2). 25 
 26 
3.3. Risk management for small treatment system 27 
The New Zealand Ministry of Health (NZMOH) recognized that the vast majority of the 28 
country’s drinking water systems were small, yet faced important challenges in providing safe drinking 29 
water (NZMOH, 2001).  The NZMOH also recognized that the traditional approach of relying primarily 30 
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on water quality monitoring in relation to drinking water quality standards is inherently a reactive 1 
approach.  Monitoring results are typically available only long after drinking water has left a treatment 2 
plant and been consumed.  Thus, the NZMOH has developed a pragmatic, down-to-earth program for 3 
encouraging Public Health Risk Management Plans (PHRMP).  This approach focuses on “events,” 4 
defined as incidents or situations that may lead to hazards being introduced into or not being removed 5 
from water (Nokes & Taylor, 2003).  In developing this approach, four barriers were identified that, if 6 
maintained effectively, will adequately control hazards: 7 
• prevention of contaminants entering the raw water of the supply; 8 
• removal of particles from the water; 9 
• inactivation of microorganisms in the water; and 10 
• maintenance of the quality of the water during distribution. 11 
This approach is meant to ensure that these barriers are present and functional to minimize the 12 
chance of failure that would give rise to “events.”  It was adopted on the premise that small water 13 
operators could relate better to the tangible concept of an event rather than a hazard, which some 14 
operators find to be more hypothetical.  Currently, the NZMOH has produced 40 specific, practical guides 15 
for various elements of typical water supply and treatment systems, all available at the NZMOH web site 16 
(www.moh.govt.nz/water).  Their sensible, pragmatic approach for developing a PHRMP is implemented 17 
in 11 steps: 18 
1. Produce an overview of the supply and decide which of the PHRMP guides are needed. 19 
2. Identify the barriers to contamination. 20 
3. Use the guides to identify events that may introduce hazards into the water. 21 
4. Use the guides to identify causes, preventive measures, checks and corrective actions. 22 
5. Decide where improvements should be made in the supply to better protect public health. 23 
6. Decide on the order in which improvements need to be made. 24 
7. Draw up a timetable for making the improvements. 25 
8. Identify links to other quality systems. 26 
9. Prepare contingency plans. 27 
10. Prepare instructions for performance assessment of the plans. 28 
11. Decide on communication policy and needs. 29 
The New Zealand system of Public Health Risk Management Plans are an excellent contribution towards 30 
greater drinking water safety and deserve wider application. 31 
 32 
4.  Discussion 33 
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A clear message that emerges from the case studies is that the painful experience at locations 1 
that have had drinking water outbreaks has not been readily recognized by other vulnerable utilities 2 
(Hrudey & Hrudey, 2004).  In a few cases, outbreaks recurred in the same community indicating a failure 3 
to determine and correct the flaws in the system.  In other cases, cogent warnings have been missed, such 4 
as the Washington County Fair outbreaks which had a highly relevant warning for Walkerton, but which 5 
failed to change the course of events in Walkerton. The New York State Department of Health 6 
investigation was made public in March of 2000, less than two months before the Walkerton outbreak 7 
happened 600 km to the west. 8 
In another case, Orangeville, a community only one hour away from Walkerton, experienced a 9 
spring outbreak caused by agricultural runoff contaminating the town’s shallow wells in April 1985.  The 10 
analysis of this outbreak published in the Canadian Journal of Public Health in 1991 noted that 11 
chlorination required close monitoring because manure contaminated runoff could overwhelm a fixed 12 
dose of chlorine, which is exactly what happened in Walkerton in May 2000.  13 
There are several key aspects of waterborne pathogens that characterize the challenge they pose 14 
to drinking water safety. Some of these are readily evident from the outbreak case studies: 15 
• Fecal (human or animal) contamination can be found wherever humans, their domestic animals 16 
or wildlife reside; although exposure is reduced as sanitation and waste management are 17 
improved, complete elimination of potential exposure to fecal contamination is not possible. 18 
• Loading of pathogens into a drinking water system sufficient to cause outbreaks of disease will 19 
not be consistent, rather it will be intermittent and infrequent when higher levels of sanitation are 20 
achieved. As a result, extended periods without apparent problems do not guarantee future 21 
safety. 22 
• Pathogens are likely to be heterogeneously distributed in water because of their origin in fecal 23 
particles that will not be totally dispersed in receiving waters and because of clumping promoted 24 
in treatment processes.  25 
• Some pathogens have high infectivity, which, combined with a likelihood of pathogens 26 
clumping into fine particles, makes inconsistent and non-uniform consumer exposure to infective 27 
doses a likely mode of infection. 28 
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• Some pathogens (e.g. Cryptosporidium) are resistant to chemical disinfection, making fine 1 
particle removal and alternative disinfection processes, such as UV, critical elements of a 2 
multiple-barrier approach. 3 
• Conditions that create a pathogen challenge to the treatment process are often event-driven (e.g. 4 
extreme weather, unusual operating conditions), meaning that such events should be recognized 5 
as potential triggers of trouble. 6 
• Multiple failures in a system must usually combine for disaster to occur, particularly as more 7 
barriers are made effective in seeking higher degrees of safety. This reality also means that one 8 
or more barriers can be failing and ineffective without an outbreak occurring. This makes the 9 
independent evaluation of treatment performance by measures such as turbidity or chlorine 10 
residual monitoring a necessary activity to assure that all of the multiple barriers are effective. 11 
 12 
Many of these challenges are intuitive for experienced drinking water professionals, but they are 13 
not necessarily established in the corporate memory of a water utility, particularly where substantial staff 14 
turnover is a reality. The intuitive experience within a successful organization needs to become accessible 15 
to struggling organizations. This implies the need for some form of networking to share experience and 16 
good practice. 17 
Responses to these challenges are compounded by a number of basic limitations in relation to the 18 
public health significance of available monitoring capabilities: 19 
• Monitoring methods for pathogens and useful indicators are generally neither sufficiently 20 
sensitive nor sufficiently specific to capture the full range of pathogen threats facing a water 21 
system. 22 
• Monitoring for pathogens and useful indicators cannot be achieved in real time. 23 
• Monitoring methods cannot be directly interpreted for public health significance because the 24 
viability and infectivity for most pathogens is usually not determined by routine methods. 25 
• Interpretation of monitoring results will be challenged by a preponderance of false positives 26 
because of the low frequency of pathogen hazards (Hrudey & Leiss, 2003). 27 
• Population health surveillance is insensitive and is likely blind to low-level endemic disease and 28 
all but the largest outbreaks. 29 
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• Adaptation and tolerance (immunity) in resident populations may hide local, chronic problems 1 
while leaving visitors vulnerable to infection that may be difficult to trace back to the source, 2 
particularly in resort communities. 3 
 4 
Despite the challenges and limitations, the best drinking water providers have shown an ability 5 
to respond to a wide range of challenges with effective prevention programs. The processes in these 6 
organizations may bend under stress, but they do not break, so failures are not allowed to accumulate to 7 
the point where they can impact the health of a consumer. An optimal preventive approach will be 8 
creative and forward-looking: 9 
• Informed vigilance is actively promoted and rewarded. 10 
• Understanding of the entire system, its challenges and limitations is promoted and actively 11 
maintained. 12 
• Effective, real-time treatment process control, based on understanding critical capabilities and 13 
limitations of the technology, is the basic operating approach. 14 
• Fail-safe multi-barriers are actively identified and maintained at a level appropriate to the 15 
challenges facing the system. 16 
• Close calls are documented and used to train staff about how the system responded under stress 17 
and to identify what measures are needed to make such close calls less likely in future. 18 
• Operators, supervisors, lab personnel and management all understand that they are entrusted 19 
with protecting the public’s health and are committed to honouring that responsibility above all 20 
else. 21 
• Operational personnel are afforded the status, training and remuneration commensurate with 22 
their responsibilities as guardians of the public’s health. 23 
• Response capability and communication are improved, particularly as post 9-11 bioterrorism 24 
concerns are being addressed. 25 
• An overall continuous improvement, total quality management (TQM) mentality will pervade 26 
the organization. 27 
 28 
5.  Conclusions 29 
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Risk management approaches offer a means to benefit from the experience of past failures. A 1 
rigorous and comprehensive approach such as reflected in the 2004 Australian Drinking Water Guidelines 2 
makes it possible for water utilities to improve their operations to the level of the best water utilities, 3 
making it extremely unlikely that consumers ever need face a drinking water outbreak. Safe drinking 4 
water is a remarkable bargain for consumers and should be valued much more highly than commonly 5 
occurs in our affluent societies. 6 
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Table 1  
Summary of fatal drinking water outbreaks in affluent countries over the past 20 years (Hrudey & Hrudey, 2004) 
Date Location Source Water Treatment Major Failure Factors Pathogens Health Consequences Risk Management Comments 
1983 
Feb  
Drumheller 
Alberta 
Canada 
Red Deer 
River 
granular filtration 
chlorination 
sewage spill upstream of water intake not 
reported, likely leading to pathogen 
contamination of drinking water supply that 
was vulnerable because of treatment by 
filtration without coagulation 
not identified but likely viral 1326 confirmed cases of 
gastroenteritis,  
3000 estimated cases 
2 deaths 
• vulnerable situation of sewage pump station upstream not 
recognized 
• failure of internal reporting of sewage spill to water 
operations 
• operating winter treatment without coagulation made 
system vulnerable 
1989-90 
Dec-Jan 
Cabool 
Missouri 
USA 
deep ground 
water 
none likely contamination of distribution system 
by unseasonably cold weather causing 
water main breaks leading to sewage cross 
contamination  
Escherichia coli O157:H7 243 confirmed cases of E. 
coli O157:H7  
32 hospital admissions 
4 deaths 
• risks associated with water main break repair during 
extreme weather not recognized 
• poor sewerage systems maintenance exposing water 
distribution to risk 
• no treatment barrier in place 
1993 
Mar-Apr 
Milwaukee 
Wisconsin 
USA 
Lake 
Michigan 
chlorination, 
KMnO4, 
coagulation, 
granular 
filtration, 
chloramination 
sanitary sewage contaminated drinking 
water intake either directly or via combined 
storm sewer outfalls during winter storms 
filtration was not being operated at 
optimum performance and measures 
recognized in the UK for reducing 
Cryptosporidium risk were not in use. 
Cryptosporidium parvum (genotype 
I, human strain). 
285 confirmed cases, 
400,000 estimated cases 
~4,400 hospital admissions 
50-70 deaths among 
immune-compromised over 
the following 2 years 
• risks associated with sewage contamination of water intake 
not recognized 
• apparently not aware of Cryptosporidium risk 
• failure to maintain optimum filtration performance 
• failure to recognize signal from consumer complaints 
1993 
Nov-Dec 
 
Gideon  
Missouri 
USA 
deep ground 
water 
none bird faeces likely contaminated water 
storage tanks and flushing of system drew 
contaminated tank water into service 
Salmonella typhimirium 31 cases confirmed 
650 cases estimated 
15 hospital admissions 
7 deaths 
• poor maintenance of water storage allowed fecal 
contamination 
• water quality management not based on good knowledge of 
system 
• no treatment barrier in place 
1999 
Sept 
Washington County 
Fair 
New York 
USA 
shallow 
ground water 
none some food and drink vendors used 
unchlorinated  well water for beverages and 
ice; shallow well was located ~11 m from a 
septic tank seepage pit with a rapid 
hydraulic connection to this well 
E. coli O157:H7 
Campylobacter jejuni 
161 confirmed cases 
2800 – 5000 estimated 
71 hospital admissions 
14 cases of haemolytic 
uremic syndrome (HUS) 
2 deaths 
• not aware of risk to well from septic seepage field 
• allowed use of unchlorinated water from a shallow well 
• failure to consider that extreme drought of previous 
summer might affect water supply safety 
2000 
May 
Walkerton 
Ontario 
Canada 
shallow 
ground water 
chlorination only inadequate chlorination or other barriers to 
cope with influx of manure contaminated 
water following heavy rains 
E. coli O157:H7 
Campylobacter jejuni 
163 cases of E. coli 
confirmed 
105 cases of Campylobacter  
12 cases with both 
2300 cases total estimated 
65 hospital admissions 
27 cases of  HUS 
7 deaths 
• ignored  warnings about vulnerability of shallow well when 
first installed in 1978 
• failed to adopt source protection recommendations at 
installation 
• regulator failed to implement policy requiring continuous 
chlorine residual monitors on vulnerable shallow wells 
• operators inadequately trained with no knowledge that 
contaminated water could kill consumers 
• failure to recognize that extreme weather and flooding 
could cause water contamination 
• failure to maintain chlorine residuals 
• failure to monitor chlorine residuals as required 
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Table 2 (Nadebaum et al., 2004) 1 
Hazard Fact Sheets and Case Studies 
Catchment and Groundwater Systems Pipelines and Distribution Systems 
Agriculture within catchments Pipeline repairs and maintenance 
Environmental hazards within catchments Cleaning of mains 
Human access to catchments   Pipe materials, private mains & plumbing   
Industrial development within catchments High flow in pipelines 
Forestry within catchments Backflow and cross connections 
Waste / wastewater management facilities Reverse flow in pipelines 
Land use within catchments Stagnant water in pipelines 
Roads within catchments Aqueducts 
Urban development within  catchments Case Studies (from the literature) 
Reservoirs and Basins Backflow in pipelines 
Algal blooms within reservoirs Inadequate disinfection of source water 
Key hydraulic factors for reservoirs Contamination and disinfection failure 
Contaminated inflows into reservoirs  Distribution system contamination 
Excessive draw or fill of reservoirs Contamination & treatment failure 
Water Treatment Plants (WTPs) Groundwater arsenic contamination 
WTP reliability Shallow groundwater contamination 
WTP design capability - toxins Reservoir & catchment contamination 
WTP design capability - alkalinity Reservoir contamination & disinfection failure 
WTP design capability - colour Groundwater contamination not located 
WTP design capability - iron & manganese Suspected breaching of mains 
WTP design capability - industrial chemicals Distribution system contamination 
WTP design capability - pathogens Unidentified contamination 
WTP design capability - taste & odour Overdose of fluoride 
WTP design capability - turbidity Lead leaching from domestic plumbing 
Disinfection Systems Sabotage of mains 
Disinfection system - reliability Cyanobacterial bloom in source water 
Disinfection system - capability  
Service Reservoirs and Tanks  
Floating Cover system contamination  
Timber system contamination  
Internal contamination    
External contamination  
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Fig. 1.  Drinking water risk management and the multiple barrier approach (Hrudey, 2001) 1 
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Fig. 2.  Reasons for system failures (after Hurst, 1998). 1 
 2 
 3 
Fig. 3  Framework for Management of Drinking Water Quality (reprinted by permission of the National Health and Medical Research Council, 4 
Canberra, Australia) 5 
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